By Sanford C. Goldberg
Sanford C. Goldberg provides a singular account of the speech act of statement. He defends the view that this sort of speech act is answerable to a constitutive norm--the norm of statement. The speculation that statement is answerable to a robustly epistemic norm is uniquely suited for clarify assertion's philosophical significance--its connections to different philosophically fascinating themes. those comprise themes in epistemology (testimony and testimonial wisdom; epistemic authority; disagreement), the philosophy of brain (belief; the speculation of psychological content), the philosophy of language (norms of language; the tactic of interpretation; the idea of linguistic content), ethics (the ethics of trust; what we owe to one another as information-seeking creatures), and different concerns which go beyond any subcategory (anonymity; belief; the department of epistemic exertions; Moorean paradoxicality). Goldberg goals to carry out those connections with no assuming whatever concerning the particular content material of assertion's norm, past relating to it as robustly epistemic. within the final component of the e-book, even if, he proposes that we do most sensible to determine the norm's epistemic normal as set in a context-sensitive type. After motivating this concept via entice Grice's Cooperative precept and spelling it out by way of what's jointly believed within the speech context, Goldberg concludes through noting how this kind of context-sensitivity will be made to sq. with assertion's philosophical significance.
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Additional info for Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech
This seems to be a feature of assertion that is common knowledge among all competent speakers. I will call this the sincerity aspect of assertion. 7 An account of assertion ought to make sense of the rectractability of assertion. Not all of the features we might hope to explain in an account of assertion are directly relevant to its aptness for communicating knowledge. I want to close with one such feature. ) It is this: assertions play a particularly prominent role in the method through which a hearer would go about interpreting a language she did not understand.
You might wonder why he is doing so—what the point of his doing so is. Still, the order of explanation goes against what the common ground account would predict: on the strength of your knowledge of the conveyed self-representation implicit in assertion, you can conclude that the purpose of his monologue, whatever it is, must involve his desire to tell you various things he takes to be (known to be) true. Essentially the same point might be put this way: at least sometimes, and arguably always, the knowledge that a speaker has made an assertion is all the context we need in order to determine that she is representing herself as knowledgeable regarding (or at least as justifiedly believing) what she says.
I will be satisfied if in presenting my case I succeed in bringing to others’ attention a source of data that I think have been underappreciated in the literature on assertion’s norm, even if my account of those data is rejected. x) Notes: (1) Most writers have put the rule in the affirmative, as in one must: assert p, only if . . By contrast, I have put the rule here in negative form: one must not assert p, unless . . I intend for this to be equivalent to the affirmative form; I use the negative form for stylistic reasons only.